Concurrent Biological, Electromagnetic Pulse, And Cyber Attacks - A Challenge To The Interagency Response by Rohrbeck, Patricia
BearWorks 
MSU Graduate Theses 
Fall 2016 
Concurrent Biological, Electromagnetic Pulse, And Cyber Attacks - 
A Challenge To The Interagency Response 
Patricia Rohrbeck 
As with any intellectual project, the content and views expressed in this thesis may be 
considered objectionable by some readers. However, this student-scholar’s work has been 
judged to have academic value by the student’s thesis committee members trained in the 
discipline. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and 
are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rohrbeck, Patricia, "Concurrent Biological, Electromagnetic Pulse, And Cyber Attacks - A Challenge To The 
Interagency Response" (2016). MSU Graduate Theses. 3042. 
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/3042 
This article or document was made available through BearWorks, the institutional repository of Missouri State 
University. The work contained in it may be protected by copyright and require permission of the copyright holder 
for reuse or redistribution. 
For more information, please contact BearWorks@library.missouristate.edu. 
 
CONCURRENT BIOLOGICAL, ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE, AND CYBER 
ATTACKS - A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERAGENCY RESPONSE 
 
 
A Masters Thesis 
Presented to  
The Graduate College of  
Missouri State University 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies 
 
 
 
By 
Patricia Rohrbeck 
December 2016 
 
 
	   ii	  
CONCURRENT BIOLOGICAL, ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE, AND CYBER 
ATTACKS – A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERAGENCY RESPONSE 
Defense and Strategic Studies 
Missouri State University, December 2016 
Master of Science 
Patricia Rohrbeck 
 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. including its military depends on an electrical grid and electricity-based critical 
infrastructure. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and cyber attack can disable not just a 
significant portion of the electrical grid and critical infrastructure, but also the network-
centric military response to such an attack. There is a large range of actors that might 
attempt EMP attacks against the U.S.. Health surveillance systems are network-centric, 
and if mass destruction is the goal of an adversary, launching a biological attack 
concurrently with EMP and cyber attacks may achieve this goal. Current agency response 
plans focus on one WMD attack at a time but combined attacks without emergency 
management plans may compromise a timely response. An EMP and cyber attack could 
amplify the effects of a biological attack because the loss of the electrical grid and 
electricity-based critical infrastructure could disable detection and response efforts as 
well as disrupt interagency efforts to coordinate a medical response. EMP is often 
perceived as science fiction because the immediate effect does not result in loss of life, 
but the cascading failures of critical infrastructure will affect civilian and military 
capabilities to support survival and recovery. Key steps to mitigate the catastrophic 
effects of an EMP attack should be taken and include: prevent an attack in the first place, 
prepare so personnel can respond after an attack, protect the critical infrastructure to limit 
the impact, and recover after an attack to restore power and critical infrastructure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The U.S. including its military depends on an electrical grid and electricity-based 
critical infrastructure such as telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, 
petroleum and natural gas, food and water, public health and health care, and security. In 
addition, the U.S. Armed Forces rely on information technology and computer networks 
to manage its weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centers. An 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and cyber attack can disable not just a significant portion of 
the electrical grid and critical infrastructure, but also the network-centric military 
response to such an attack. A high altitude nuclear detonation, radiofrequency weapon, or 
solar flare can cause an EMP. The range of actors that might attempt EMP attacks against 
the U.S. is increasing and may include countries with nuclear weapons such as Russia 
and China, rogue states with limited conventional and nuclear military capabilities such 
as North Korea, as well as terrorist groups throughout the world that seek to inflict 
catastrophic damage on America.  The U.S. military has hardened some of its strategic 
defense systems, such as missile silos, but not all systems are protected and little effort 
has been made to protect the civilian infrastructure. Even if hardened, systems can be 
disrupted by a cyber attack in preparation for an EMP. Health surveillance systems in the 
U.S. are network-centric, and if mass destruction is the goal of an adversary, launching a 
biological attack concurrently with EMP and cyber attacks may achieve this goal. Current 
agency preparedness and response plans focus on one WMD attack mode at a time so 
combined attacks without emergency management plans may present a vulnerability. An 
EMP and cyber attack could amplify the effects of a biological attack because the loss of 
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the electrical grid and electricity-based critical infrastructure could disable detection and 
response efforts as well as disrupt interagency efforts to coordinate a medical response. 
 Detection of biological agents could be disabled after an EMP and cyber attack 
because electronic healthcare surveillance systems would be no longer operational and 
could no longer process and exchange information among agencies. Laboratories would 
no longer receive and be able to process suspected specimens, which could not identify 
potentially hazardous biological agents. Telecommunication has a crucial role in health 
surveillance because it makes receiving and analyzing of health encounter data via 
standard, cellular phones, and computers networks possible. Lack of communication 
from one healthcare facility to another significantly hinders timely detection and response 
efforts. Without a timely response, the spread of disease in a population may not be 
contained during its early stages and could lead to an outbreaks and epidemics. Without 
the ability to detect biological agents, public health officials cannot initiate timely 
treatment and preventive measures, which could result in higher than expected morbidity 
and mortality. 
 Response efforts may also be disrupted because resources needed to treat medical 
emergencies cannot be delivered or need to be diverted to fill other gaps. With the 
breakdown of the entire transportation system in EMP-affected areas, sending laboratory 
specimens or distributing medical supplies may not be a priority as compared to food and 
water deliveries. This may disrupt how public health officials assess the ongoing health 
threat and how treatment has to be prioritized. Additionally, medical supplies and 
pharmaceuticals may not be delivered in the same dose and format requiring adjustments 
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before administering. As a result, disruption of resource supply chains may cause a delay 
in patient treatment and care. 
  Response efforts may also be disrupted because interagency efforts could not be 
coordinated due to the lack of communication. For emergencies across state lines, support 
from federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Health and 
Human Services (HHS), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is 
usually requested. Yet without the ability to communicate and travel, federal support may 
be delayed, which requires local agencies to lead the initial response. Local public health 
and health care personnel may lack the necessary training to coordinate a medical 
response to a biological agent. As a result, response efforts may be executed inefficiently. 
Vertical coordination may cause issues with local response efforts, which makes 
communication imperative to prevent duplication of efforts. 
 One could argue that after an EMP and cyber attack adversaries may not see the 
need for a biological attack because lack of electricity, water and food supplies alone will 
result in significant loss of lives. Yet, in order to recover from these attacks and to restore 
electricity and normal operation of systems, there need to be healthy people who can 
contribute to the recovery process. Additionally, one could argue that after a major 
blackout, adversaries may have a difficult time disbursing biological agents so that such 
an event may not occur. At the same time and in order to cause high casualties, it may be 
more plausible that an agent could be distributed immediately prior to an EMP and cyber 
attack without individuals realizing that a biological attack had occurred. This would 
allow a disease to spread within a population undetected and untreated until a major 
outbreak has occurred that may not be contained due to limited medical supplies. 
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 Disruption of the electrical grid, electricity-based infrastructure, and network-
centric systems as a result of an EMP and cyber attack and concurrent with a biological 
attack may cause significantly more destruction and loss of lives than any of these WMD 
by themselves. EMP is often perceived as science fiction, and the immediate effect 
usually does not result in loss of life, but the unprecedented cascading failures of critical 
infrastructure will affect civilian and military capabilities to support survival and will 
compromise recovery. Comprehensive threat assessment and scenario planning for EMP 
and cyber attacks remain underdeveloped and so does a combined attack with a 
biological agent. As a result, adversaries could exploit this vulnerability so that 
interagency and multi-disciplinary efforts are needed to defend against these concurrent 
WMDs. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF BIOLOGICAL, EMP AND CYBER ATTACKS 
The biological threat is real and growing.  A threat consists of intent and 
capability and even though many state actors and terrorist organizations have expressed 
intent in the past, many have expanded their capabilities and developed or acquired 
biological agents in recent years. At the same time, not every biological agent capable of 
causing infectious diseases and outbreaks can be transformed into a biological weapon. 
Biological agents are diverse in regards to biological characteristics, disbursal, the 
number of people they can affect as well as  the rate of survival. To distinguish between 
infectious agent and potential biological weapon, agencies need to be able to 
electronically monitor population health. Identification of clusters or outbreaks of 
diseases in a timely manner is important to coordinate effective interventions. As a result, 
prevention of contagious diseases with high morbidity and mortality presumes a fully 
operational electrical grid that supports disease surveillance systems. Individuals that 
were exposed to biological agents can easily be identified through comprehensive 
surveillance efforts, and vaccination or medical treatment will contain further spread of 
disease. An EMP and cyber attack could amplify the effects of exposure to a biological 
agent by disabling electronic surveillance and communication systems. This would limit 
the ability of public health officials and health care staff to identify unusual disease 
occurrences in the population. Unmonitored disease progression and transmission would 
result in higher than expected morbidity and mortality. 
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Biological Warfare Agents 
Early detection and identification of unusual symptoms or disease spikes is 
crucial to prevent spread of infections with biological agents. Naturally occurring 
biological agents such as virus, bacteria, fungi, protozoa or toxins can devastate livestock, 
crops, and dairy or produce supplies, harming millions of people and producing a 
debilitating effect on the U.S. economy.1 These natural biological agents can be 
weaponized and used during a WMD event. The preparedness against biological warfare 
agents (BWA) needs complete knowledge about the disease, better research and training 
facilities, diagnostic facilities, and improved public health systems.2 Biological attacks 
require only release of a small quantity of viable material since agents are capable of self-
replication to spread disease throughout a population.3 BWA pose a challenge to public 
health because they can cause a large number of causalities for many symptoms and will 
therefore be difficult to detect.4 Additionally, the effects of these agents are not always 
instantaneous and require few hours to weeks before symptoms appear in the affected 
population.5 As a result, ongoing health surveillance of the population is necessary to 
detect unusual symptoms during early onset of disease to prevent large-scale mortality 
and reduce morbidity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hudson Institute,” A National Blueprint For Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform 
2 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
3 Hudson Institute,” A National Blueprint For Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform 
Needed to Optimize Efforts,” Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on 
Biodefense, Oct 2015, p. 20, at http://hudson.org/research/11824-a-national-blueprint-
for-biodefense-leadership-and-major-reform-needed-to-optimize-efforts	  (Nov	  1,	  2015).	  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created a BWA 
classification based on public health impact, dissemination potential, public perception, 
and public health preparedness requirements rather than biological characteristic to assist 
public health officials with creating targeted response efforts.6 The categories rang from 
most dangerous (Category A) to emerging infections (Category C), and healthcare 
providers should be alert to illness patterns and diagnostic clues of these agents.7 Some of 
the category A agents of concern are plague, anthrax, and smallpox because they were 
associated with intentional use in the past or could cause high mortality if no available 
treatment options were used. The category A agents pose unique health surveillance 
challenges due to their distinct biological characteristics and require targeted response 
efforts cases are identified in the population. 
Plague is a curable infectious disease caused by the bacteria Yersinia pestis, 
which, without antibiotic treatment, can cause a 50 percent mortality rate.8 As a BWA, 
the plague bacteria can be disbursed and inhaled as an aerosol. If inhaled, the bacteria can 
cause pneumonic plague, which is highly contagious and can spread from person-to-
person by airborne droplets through sneezing or coughing. Clinical signs will show after 
one to six days after exposure and include common cold symptoms such as fever, swollen 
lymph nodes, chills, cough (with or without bloody sputum), and pneumonia.9 Since 
Yersinia pestis is naturally occurring, it could easily be isolated and grown in laboratories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Recognition of Illness Associated 
with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 
Oct 19, 2001, 50(41): 893-7.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
9 Ibid.  
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and then be weaponized. Even though pneumonic plague is a rare naturally occurring 
event, the symptoms mimic common cold and flu symptoms, so that cases may not 
immediately seek medical care. As a result, healthcare providers may not identify the 
disease in its early stages. In this case, syndromic surveillance may be helpful in 
identifying unusual clusters of cold symptoms that would warrant further investigation by 
public health officials. Plague can easily be treated if identified early and poses less of a 
health threat, but if surveillance system do not pick up potential cases and individuals are 
left untreated, the mortality rate can be higher than expected. 
Smallpox (variola virus) has no proven treatment except for supportive medical 
care, which makes early detection and isolation of cases important to prevent further 
spread of disease among the population. Vaccination to prevent disease is the most 
appropriate course of action, yet the vaccine is no longer administered routinely to the 
general population in the U.S. since the mid-70s. With waning immunity among those 
who previously received the vaccine and the large number of unvaccinated individuals in 
today’s population, the case fatality rate could be as high as 30 percent; survivors are 
often left with permanent scares or blindness.10 The incubation period averages 12 days 
during which a case experiences headaches and fever only; the pus-filled vesicles 
throughout the body, indicative of smallpox infection, only show after the 12-day 
period.11 During the incubation period, cases are highly infectious and can spread the 
smallpox virus through airborne droplets. The deliberate release of smallpox will be 
difficult to detect until individuals develop lesions and seek medical care. As a result, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
11 Ibid. 
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main priority to contain further spread of disease will be tracking, isolating, and 
monitoring of individuals who have been in close contact with a case. This will require 
close monitoring of the affected population. 
Anthrax, a spore-forming bacterium (Bacillus anthracis), infects humans through 
direct contact (ingestion, inhalation, cutaneous, injection) with the spores and is not 
transmitted from person-to-person, but the spores can be easily disbursed among a 
population. Signs and symptoms can develop after one days of exposure up to two 
months depending on the type of anthrax infection; the most severe form, inhalation 
anthrax, develops symptoms rapidly and consist of flu-like symptoms. Antibiotic 
treatment can be effective, but if inhalation anthrax is not treated within 48 hours after 
exposure the fatality rate can reach up to 90-100 percent.12Anthrax vaccine is not 
administered to the general public, but only to those who are at risk for naturally 
occurring exposure or military personnel and first responders. Since testing of blood 
samples to confirm anthrax infection can take up to 48 hours, but immediate treatment 
may be necessary to save lives. Environmental surveillance through sensors to pick up 
disbursal of spores may be more crucial than syndromic surveillance.  
 Identification of biological agents is complicated due to the diverse nature of the 
agents and the variety of modes of transmission and disbursal methods. The use of 
anthrax spores in letters in the 2001 bioterrorism event, which caused inhalation anthrax 
emphasized the need for immediate detection and identification of biothreat agents from 
environmental samples as well as from affected persons.13 Identification of BWA relies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
13 Ibid. 
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on rapid and accurate systems capable of detecting multiple threat agents since symptoms 
of many biological agents are similar. In addition to human clinical samples like blood, 
sputum, urine, stool, cerebrospinal fluid, a system also needs to be able to analyze 
powdery materials, food and water samples, and environmental air and soil samples.14 
Good sample preparation is needed depending on the detection system, and sample 
preparation can take hours to days depending on the standardized protocols and often 
cannot be performed in field conditions, especially if the agent is highly contagious and 
lethal.15 Although the sample preparation and efficacy of extraction procedures determine 
the concentration of the agent availability for detection, in some instances, the viability of 
virus or bacteria has to be confirmed by conventional laboratory culture methods.16 One 
concern are genetically modified bacterial and viral agents not covered under the list of 
known and probable agents which may pose an additional threat and make the detection 
much more difficult.17 As a result, public health officials depend on readily accessible 
health surveillance data and detection systems to support their efforts in identifying the 
BWA. 
 
Biosensors, Disease Surveillance System, and Health Communication 
 Biological attacks are difficult to predict and prevent because biological agents 
have unique characteristics that could be exploited for specific purposes by adversaries. 
As a result, there is a need for rapid and accurate detection systems to ensure public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
17 Ibid. 
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health officials know early on which agent(s) was used during an attack. These systems 
are highly interconnected and depend on a continuous data exchange to identify unusual 
events.  
Local clinics and hospital laboratories are the first facilities likely to encounter 
biological agents as infected or exposed individuals seek medical assistance, which 
requires them to initiate screening of they encounter a potential case.18 Widely available 
microbial identification systems used on a routine basis by clinical laboratories are not 
designed or optimized for detection of BWAs.19 The CDC developed BWA screening 
guidelines, but the assumption is that hospital staff on duty during an event had sufficient 
training to know when to implement these guidelines. As a result, tools are being 
developed to detect BWAs. For the detection of biological agents, sensors have been 
developed for biochemical, immunologic and nucleic acid based detection systems.20 
These sensors combine a biological recognition system and a physical transducer but are 
not as specific as antibody- or nucleic acid-based methods.2122 Other sensors, such as 
electronic nose devices, can detect volatile organic compounds and toxins produced 
during the growth of bacteria or fungi.2324 Electronic nose devices can be rapid and 
sensitive but not very specific because the compounds produced by microorganisms can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Lim DV, Simpson JM, Kearns EA, Kramer MF, Current and Developing Technologies 
for Monitoring Agents of Bioterrorism and Biowarfare. Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 
Oct 2005, 18(4), 583-607. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Thavaselvam D, Vijayaraghavan R., Biological warfare agents, Journal of Pharmacy 
&BioAllied Sciences, Jul-Sep 2010, 2(3): 179-188. 
21 Lim. 
22 Thavaselvam. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Lim DV, Simpson JM, Kearns EA, Kramer MF, Current and Developing Technologies 
for Monitoring Agents of Bioterrorism and Biowarfare. Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 
Oct 2005, 18(4), 583-607. 
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fluctuate depending on environmental conditions and different organisms can produce 
similar volatile products.25 As a result, detection tools such as biosensors used 
exclusively for surveillance purposes may not produce the needed rapid and accurate 
results; instead, they should be used in combination with other surveillance systems. With 
that being said, surveillance systems are highly interdependent and require continuous 
data exchange to put results into context. 
  Biosensors may be able to identify the BWA, but further laboratory testing may 
be needed to sequence the agent in an effort to determine if the agent was engineered and 
its origin. Databases have been developed to organize information around gene or protein 
function for pathogen characterization.26 The GenBank sequence database includes 
complete genomic sequences as well as individual sequences, which can also be used to 
determine the agent’s origin as well as DNA synthesis orders that use sequences of 
pathogens of concern.27 In recent years, genomic barcoding has been used to standardize 
genome segment use as the discriminatory parameter for detecting the presence of an 
organism or to distinguish it from other species.28 As a result, genetic databases with 
sequence information could address concerns about the possibility of engineering de novo 
biological pathogens that could be used during a biological attack. Yet, genetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Lim DV, Simpson JM, Kearns EA, Kramer MF, Current and Developing Technologies 
for Monitoring Agents of Bioterrorism and Biowarfare. Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 
Oct 2005, 18(4), 583-607. 
26 Lindler LE, Lebeda FJ, Korch GW, Biological Weapons Defense: Infectious Diseases 
and Counterbioterrorism, (Humana Press: Totowa, New Jersey, 2005), p.390. 
27 Valdivia-Granda WA, Biodefense Oriented Genomic-Based Pathogen Classification 
System: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense, Mar 2012, 
3(1), 1000113. 
28 Valdivia-Granda WA, Biodefense Oriented Genomic-Based Pathogen Classification 
System: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense, Mar 2012, 
3(1), 1000113.  
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sequencing of a BWA takes time and may only be valuable after a biological attack to 
gather further information, which suggests that medical encounter data and syndromic 
surveillance systems may have greater utility to detect early onset of disease within a 
population.  
 Various databases have been developed to monitor signs, symptoms, and 
biological information related to a biological attack. The Defense Health Agency of the 
DoD maintains and operates the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), which is 
a longitudinal and relational database. It contains medical encounter, laboratory, and 
immunization data as well as demographic and military information on all service 
members during their active service time. DMSS receives data feeds from numerous DoD  
agencies, which depending on the data are loaded daily, weekly, or monthly. The data is 
mainly used to assess health trends and establish baselines for diseases. Most analyses are 
published in the Medical Surveillance Monthly Report, which are readily available on the 
agencies website. For near real-time surveillance both DoD and civilian public health 
departments utilize ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification 
of Community-based Epidemics), a syndromic surveillance system that provides alerts on 
unusual increases of infectious disease related symptoms. Updated medical data, such as 
encounter, pharmacy prescriptions, radiology, and laboratory test orders, are loaded 
multiple times during the day into ESSENCE and surveillance staff have the opportunity 
to access patient-identifiable data for further investigation or validation. Disease 
surveillance databases rely on in-person patient encounters to capture data on the medical 
event, but often, patients do not have access to medical facilities requiring other methods 
of patient-provider interaction.  
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In areas to far away from medical facilities or in communities with limited 
medical services, telemedicine, a combination of telecommunication and information 
technology, has been used to bridge the continuum of care. Telemedicine used in DoD 
and in civilian medical communities is integrated with medical information databases and 
linked to the National Library of Medicine.29 Telemedicine consultations rely on 
computerized consult sheets that were developed using database management software 
and represent multimedia medical records.30 The telemedicine approach is based on a 
computerized two-way audio communication and image transfer linked with satellite 
video teleconferencing.31 In addition, consults can be conducted via email, smart phone, 
wireless tools, and other forms of telecommunications technology. The use of 
telemedicine during a biological attack could improve situational awareness and ensure 
comprehensive surveillance of the population by including communities and areas that 
would not access hospital care.32 Besides telemedicine, telehealth applications such as 
hotlines and interactive web-based programs can provide information and guidance to 
communities and manage patient behaviors after a biological attack.33 Telehealth 
message could be used to alleviate public fear and panic to avoid the “worried well” from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Lindler LE, Lebeda FJ, Korch GW, Biological Weapons Defense: Infectious Diseases 
and Counterbioterrorism, (Humana Press: Totowa, New Jersey, 2005), p.395. 
29 Valdivia-Granda WA, Biodefense Oriented Genomic-Based Pathogen Classification 
System: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense, Mar 2012, 
3(1), 1000113. 
30 Lindler, p.395. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Public Health Emergency (PHE)—Department of Health and Human Services, 
Telehealth Report to Congress, Jan 2009, p.19, at 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/pahpa/Documents/telehealthrtc-091207.pdf (1 
Nov 2015). 
33 Ibid. 	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overcrowding emergency rooms. Additionally, telehealth communication programs could 
provide information on points of dispensing for vaccinations or antibiotic prophylaxis 
administration during emergency management events. Telemedicine and telehealth 
networks allow for outreach to all communities within a population but require an 
operational telecommunication infrastructure and electronic access to medical records 
and medical services.  
The combined use of biosensors, disease surveillance systems, and telemedicine 
for health communication provides timely and relevant information to detect biological 
attacks and assess their impact on the population. The alignment of health information is 
critical to make informed decisions on intervention and prevention strategies to reduce 
morbidity and mortality. At the same time, these systems depend heavily on a fully 
operational electrical grid. New funding is provided to further electronically integrate 
existing systems and develop new systems rather than invest in securing to electric grid. 
Advances in information technology have paved the way for public health surveillance to 
function more efficiently and effectively, but this progress can be eradicated in no time if 
circuits have been damaged and electronic health surveillance tools can no longer be 
accessed. As a result, efforts should be made to harden existing surveillance systems  
 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Cyber Attack 
 Monitoring a population to identify potential exposure to a biological agent 
presumes an electrical grid that is functioning since detection, surveillance, identification, 
and communication efforts are based on electronic system capabilities. An EMP is a 
high-intensity burst of electromagnetic energy that can destroy, damage, or cause the 
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malfunction of electronic systems by overloading their circuits.34 Harmless to people but 
catastrophic to critical infrastructure such as electric power, telecommunications, 
transportation, banking and finance, food and water for which there are limited 
countermeasures in place.35 A single nuclear weapon detonated at high-altitude will 
generate an electromagnetic pulse that can damage the power grid across the entire 
contiguous U.S.36 Non-nuclear weapons, also referred to as radiofrequency weapons, can 
also generate an EMP but have a limited range that could damage the critical 
infrastructure locally.37 The power grid could also be downed through hackers during a 
cyber attack. EMP or cyber attacks are threats that can hold society at risk of catastrophic 
consequences especially if launched concurrently with a biological attack. 
An EMP could arise from natural, man-made, or weapons detonation, yet the 
effects on the electrical grid and information systems are similar even though different in 
intensity. A naturally occurring EMP could happen through lightening or a solar flare 
reaching earth. A man-made EMP or High-Power Microwave (HPM) electromagnetic 
energy can be produced through special electrical equipment that transforms battery 
power, or a powerful chemical reaction, or explosion into intense microwaves.38 These 
microwaves can be as damaging to electronics as a high altitude EMP but on a smaller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Securethegrid, EMP: Technology’s Worst Nightmare, 2015, at 
http://securethegrid.com/emp-technologys-worst-nightmare/ (Oct 30, 2015). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Wilson C., “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave 
(HPM) Devices: Threat Assessment”, Congressional Research Service Report to 
Congress. Jul 2008, p. 6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32544.pdf , 3 Nov 2015. 
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scale over a smaller area.39 An EMP caused by a nuclear detonation above the U.S. has 
the potential to cause large-scale destruction and disruption of electrical devices and 
systems. The two types of EMP threats that are most concerning are the 1) intentional 
electromagnetic interference (IEMI) and the 2) high altitude electromagnetic pulse 
(HEMP). The IEMI is created by deliberate electromagnetic weapon attack, and the 
HEMP is created by a high-altitude nuclear weapon detonation. A single nuclear weapon  
exploded at high altitude (40 to 400 kilometers) above the U.S. will interact with the 
Earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetic field to produce an EMP radiating down to 
the earth.40 The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed with 
the intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging electrical power systems, 
electronics, and information systems.41 With its destructive power toward the electrical 
grid and critical infrastructure, a HEMP may be used by adversaries and should be 
considered a WMD even though it initially will not cause physical damage or loss of life.  
The nuclear EMP, even though instantaneous, is a complex multi-pulse that 
occurs in three phases which is unique to the nuclear detonation. The first component 
(E1) is a free-field energy pulse, also called the “electromagnetic shock” that disrupts or 
damages electronics-based control systems, sensors, communications systems, protective 
systems, computers, and similar devices.42 Disruption occurs over a very large area and 
could include multiple cities or an entire region such as the East Coast. The second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Wilson C., “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave 
(HPM) Devices: Threat Assessment”, Congressional Research Service Report to 
Congress. Jul 2008, p. 6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32544.pdf , 3 Nov 2015. 
40 Foster JS et al. “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. Volume1: Executive Report 2004”, 2004, p. 1, 
at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf (2 Nov 2015). 
41 Ibid. 
42Foster, p. 5. 
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component (E2) is similar to lightening and would affect the same geographic area as the 
first component.43 Most critical infrastructure has protective measure for defense against 
lightning strikes, but since the E2 component follows within a small fraction of the E1, it 
has the ability to destroy many protective and control features and damage systems.44 The 
third component (E3) is a slower-rising, longer-duration pulse that disrupts electricity  
transmission lines and therefore causes damage to the electrical supply and distribution 
system.45 The three components build on each other and in unison can destroy about 70 
percent of the total electrical power load within a region of attack. 
In order to understand the impact of an EMP attack, it is important to understand 
the electromagnetic immunity. Most electronic equipment can survive a pulse of 10 Volts 
per meter (V/m). Computers and other systems based on microprocessors are vulnerable 
to radiated narrowband fields above 30 V/m, and newer high-speed PCs may be resistant 
up to about 300 V/m.46 Most robust aircraft cockpit equipment is only designed to 
survive up to 7,200 V/m. A HEMP could result in a high intensity pulse of over 10,000 
V/m, which is more than 1,000 times than what IT systems can handle. In addition, a 
HEMP will not just damage the electrical grid, but can also have a direct impact on stored 
data by irrevocably destroying and erasing data. Another key vulnerability are 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADAs) which are small 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Foster JS et al. “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. Volume1: Executive Report 2004”, 2004, p. 6, 
at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf (2 Nov 2015). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Foster, p. 1. 
46 Radasky W.A., “Electromagnetic Warfare is Here: A briefcase-size radio weapon 
could wreak havoc in our networked world”, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), 25 Apr 2015,   
http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/military/electromagnetic-warfare-is-here , 20 Nov 
2015. 
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computers imbedded into the electrical grid and critical infrastructure. SCADAs regulate 
the flow of electricity into a transformer, control the flow of gas through a pipeline, or 
run traffic control lights and manage the infrastructure of entire cities, and are highly  
vulnerable to an EMP.47 As a result, a HEMP significantly disrupts the critical 
infrastructure, electrical grid, and electronic equipment, and is more than just a power 
outage because some of the damage is permanent. 
Electronic failures occur all the time under normal operation, but any type of 
EMP induces unique failures and upsets which may take weeks, months, or years to 
repair. Some components of critical infrastructures, such as large turbines, generators, 
and high-voltage transformers in electrical power systems, would require long periods of 
time to repair or replace.48 Similar damage occurred during the Northeast power blackout 
of 1965, during which the Ravenswood power plant in New York City suffered damage 
and was out of service for nearly a year.49 In 1977, two lightning strikes caused 
overloading in the electric power substations of the Con Edison power company in New 
York City, and even though the blackout only lasted one day, nearly 3,000 people were 
arrested for widespread looting and damage repair costs were approximately $346 
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million.50 Similar effects occurred during a less sever event caused by a HPM. In 2001, a 
U.S. Comanche helicopter equipped with HPM weapons, generated a low-level energy 
pulse while performing a radar test that disrupted GPS systems of a nearby airport for 
two weeks.51 In comparison to routine technical issues with electronic devices and 
systems, EMP produces simultaneous outages and damages of electronic and of other 
electrical equipment. These concurrent outages make it difficult to determine where to 
take actions first to restore the systems further slowing down the recovery process. The 
National electrical grid not infrequently operates at or very near local limits on its 
physical capacity to move power from generation to load so that even minor upsets can 
cause a functional collapse.52 Prior power outages, even though not as destructive as a 
large-scale EMP, have shown that repairing the electrical grid can be time consuming and 
can be a significant financial burden. 
After having observed the impact of prior outages similar to an EMP, adversaries 
may be interested in pursuing EMP attacks. To launch a HEMP at the U.S., an adversary 
would need missiles capable of an intercontinental launch or a platform that can be 
moved within range of the U.S. to launch a missile. In order to discuss an imminent 
attack, cyber attacks could be used to weaken power and early warning systems. Cyber 
attacks are executed via the internet and use malicious code to alter existing computer 
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code, logic, or data. A cyber attack may be different from an EMP because it often leaves 
“fingerprints” behind, which can then be used to track its originator. An EMP, on the 
other hand, is often so quick that electronic systems will be unable to identify the cause  
of the electronic shutdown.  One of the main goals of a cyber attack is to steal 
information, but it can also be used to disrupt online processes. In 2003, more than 200 
power plants were shut down after a software bug in the computer system of one power 
plant caused an initial blackout.53 Today’s power grid relies increasingly on modern 
computational platforms (SCADAs), field devices, and communication networks so that 
IT functions intended to surveil, disrupt, deny, degrade, compromise, or control the 
performance the system could be introduced.54 Since an EMP could cause more large-
scale damage and may be more suitable for a WMD attack, a cyber attack may be 
executed in combination with an EMP to eliminate detection. Cyber weapons need to be 
tailored to the devices they are targeting and only attack systems that are software 
dependent.55 Neither EMP nor cyber attacks are deterministic, nor are they completely 
random, which makes it difficult to predict their effect.56 Not every targeted system will 
be in the same state of vulnerability, so there is a random component to the failures 
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induced by a cyber attack.57 Both EMP and cyber attack present threats to systems and 
using them combined could cause prolonged regional and national recovery. 
An EMP and cyber attack may not have a direct harmful effects on human life, 
yet indirectly disrupt the infrastructure necessary for human survival such as food and 
water supplies, equipment for hospitals and first responders, as well as fuel distribution 
and transportation. The simultaneous loss of communications and power as a result of an 
EMP attack will make it difficult to ascertain the nature and location of the damage and 
to send personnel to the sites to initiate repairs. 58 With electrical systems non-operational 
for weeks or months or longer, a concurrent biological attack would be difficult to detect. 
Electronic equipment such as biological sensors and testing devices will be non-
functional after an EMP. In addition, the healthcare sector relies on advanced information 
technology systems to track medical encounters, patient health histories, pharmaceutical 
prescriptions and prophylaxes, as well as laboratory testing results. These health 
surveillance systems depend on telecommunication networks to maintain data transfers 
and exchange of information between organizations. These systems are also used to 
communicate with patients to send out alerts and notifications during emergencies to 
advice communities on preventive health measures and when to seek medical care. Since 
the symptoms of most diseases caused by a biological agents mimic the symptoms of the 
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common cold, people may be less likely to seek medical care, especially if they have to 
face other priorities such as procuring food and water. This may allow for uncontrolled 
spread of disease within populations, and if affected individuals who seek treatment at a 
later stage of the disease may overwhelm emergency rooms with limited ability to 
properly test, diagnose, and treat them.  It is therefore not the immediate effect of the loss 
of power that makes an EMP so destructive, but the cascading losses of critical 
infrastructure over time. 
In summary, biological, EMP and cyber attacks pose unique response challenges 
and by themselves are destructive in nature. EMP and cyber attack as compared to a 
biological attack may not directly affect human life, but the consequences of lack of 
electricity and data systems that manage our daily lives will indirectly affect our well-
being. Most biological category A agents are extremely contagious and deadly if not 
identified and treated immediately. At the same time, they are relatively easy to identify 
and manage in a population if health surveillance systems are fully functioning. Yet, 
without existing electronic public health tools, it will be difficult to identify these agents 
and track the mode of transmission and individuals affected. As a result, these agents can 
become true hazards and can lead to increased morbidity and mortality. EMP and cyber 
attacks can disable disease surveillance systems and have the potential to exacerbate the 
effects of a biological attack by itself. 
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BIODEFENSE—SENSORS, FEDERAL SURVEILLANCE AND SUPPLY 
PROGRAMS 
 
Prevention of a WMD event and responding to one if people have been exposed is 
a multimodal and multiagency approach, which requires resource and information 
sharing. There is no central agency that leads control and coordination of the defense 
against biological threats. Many agencies at the local, state, and federal level with unique 
capabilities are involved in a response to a biological attack. The lack of centralized 
biodefense leadership may be of concern because it allows agencies to operate 
independently or duplicate each other’s efforts. The lack of a comprehensive, cohesive, 
and regularly updated strategy has resulted in disorganization and confusion on how to 
execute a response.59 Biodefense planning has become driven by agencies with 
requirements that may or may not meaningfully contribute to national biodefense.60 Yet, 
the limitations and shortfalls of the various disease surveillance systems sponsored by 
federal agencies is only one problem. Each system will be affected by an EMP and cyber 
attack through disrupting the normal functioning of system components such as 
electronic tools and equipment, data transfer, transportation and delivery mechanisms. 
The following sections assume that a biological agent has been released among a 
population followed by an EMP and cyber attack and will assess a selected number of 
surveillance systems most commonly used to detect biological agents. 
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BioWatch  
BioWatch, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program developed in 
collaboration with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is a nationwide bio-
surveillance system designed to detect the intentional release of selected aerosolized 
biological agents. It is an environmental monitoring system that collects and analyzes 
samples in designated laboratories every 24 hours.61Deployed in more than 30 
metropolitan areas throughout the country, the system is a collaborative effort of health 
personnel at all levels of government. The BioWatch program has air samplers intended 
to swiftly detect the presence of certain aerosolized biological agents to assist local and 
state health officials in their surveillance efforts.62 BioWatch has the potential to provide 
a timelier alert than the public health and health care system if a large-scale aerosol attack 
occurs where BioWatch is deployed, if an air sampler lies in the path of the release, and if 
the pathogen used is one of those included in the BioWatch laboratory assays.63 With that 
being said, small quantities of a biological agent may not be detected by BioWatch and is 
a limitation of the surveillance capability.  
BioWatch may be a useful system to detect specific biological agents, but 
infectious disease surveillance through the public health and health care systems is 
broader and more flexible than BioWatch. Disease surveillance systems currently in 
existence have the potential to detect infectious diseases resulting from various 
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exposures.64 One of the issues with the BioWatch program is that it is not fully integrated 
into the local systems in which it operates. The “BioWatch System” refers to the 
collection of operational components that produce information from air sampling and 
feed it into a public health decision-making process to determine appropriate response to 
BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR).65 Public health officials particularly need greater 
assistance in developing the necessary capabilities to interpret and respond to BARs.66 
BioWatch may be able to detect DNA segments of a BWA, but those may not be BARs 
because detection does not necessarily imply a biological attack occurred or that 
individuals have been exposed.67 Besides early detection, BioWatch is currently working 
on improving communication with local, state, and federal public health officials.  
Currently, the program does not share information with other systems on animal health, 
vector control, water and air quality, meteorology, and syndromic health surveillance.68 
Even though the information may be helpful for early warning and situation awareness, 
as a stand-alone system BioWatch data may not be accurately interpreted. 
 BioWatch has its limitations but otherwise may be a useful surveillance tool as 
part of a larger surveillance system. One of the concerns is that during an EMP or cyber 
attack or both, BioWatch may not be able to function because the equipment depends on 
electricity. Additionally, staff may not be able to reach the equipment in a timely manner 
due to disruption of transportation, which will result in the filters not being shipped to the 
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nearest laboratory for analysis. The air samplers BioWatch deploys have a 24-hour 
collection cycle, and their dry filters are manually collected and transported to 
laboratories for processing and analysis.69 The program requires a person to go out every  
day to collect the filters and deliver them to the laboratory according to strict standard 
operating procedures.70 With this approach, the time between exposure, detection, 
confirmation and declaration of a BAR is somewhere between 12 to 36 hours.71 If 
BioWatch could move to autonomous detection systems, this time could be reduced to 3 
to 6 hours.72 As a result, routine maintenance and monitoring of the sensors is crucial for 
the program to function, which may be fully disrupted through an EMP or cyber attack 
therefore making this surveillance tool inoperable. 
 
BioSense 
Mandated in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, the BioSense platform was launched in 2003 as a National 
Syndromic Surveillance Program (NSSP) by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). The program is considered a “system-of-systems” that integrates 
patients’ symptoms, quantities and types of drug prescriptions, number of emergency 
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room visits, and various other patient data.73 It is a nationwide system that builds on state 
and local health department surveillance systems.74 State and local systems often operate 
independently from each other and do not share information, yet the purpose of BioSense 
is to combine these existing data systems. The data is still stored at state and local health 
departments, who collect them for their disease surveillance purposes, but CDC is 
granted access to the data, which creates for a more robust framework, so if one data feed 
is interrupted, BioSense will still function with the available data.75 BioSense started 
incorporating Department of Defense (DoD) health data, to include outpatient encounter 
data, as well as data from Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals to be able to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance on the majority of the U.S. population. The goal of 
BioSense is to provide public health officials on all levels a common electronic health 
information system with standardized tools and procedures for rapidly collecting, sharing, 
and evaluating of information.  
Over the years, the BioSense platform has undergone numerous updates and 
revisions, but the system was never fully operational. The system is now being switching 
to ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance system for the Early Notification of Community-
based Epidemics), which has been used successfully by local and state health 
departments for the past 10 years for local syndromic surveillance purposes as well as by 
DoD for surveillance on its military population in the U.S. and overseas. Additionally, 
data for the new BioSense platform will be stored on a secure internet government cloud 
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rather than on servers in fixed facilities.76 This means that copies of the data are 
distributed among multiple servers in widely separated locations, so that no single 
disaster can destroy or render the data inaccessible.77 Amazon Web Services, currently 
one of the leading provider of cloud computing, guarantees that data will survive any 
catastrophe; yet, in 2009, lightning caused its cloud computing services to go offline for 
four hours.78 In 2012, a storm disrupted an Amazon data center in Virginia, disrupting 
access to Netflix, Instagram, Pinterest, and other sites for hours, even though no data was 
destroyed.79 Even though single catastrophic events may not disrupt cloud services for a 
lengthy period since other cloud servers can support the system, large-scale events, such 
as EMP may impact all cloud servers in a region and could disrupt and destroy data.80 As 
a result, surveillance system platforms, no matter how they store data, are vulnerable to 
EMP and access may be disrupted.   
The goal of the new BioSense platform is to enhance regional and national all-
hazards public health situation awareness, yet cooperative agreements have not been 
signed by all public health departments to share data and information electronically. So 
far, only 35 public health jurisdictions have entered cooperative agreements, which 
include states, cities, and counties.81 For example, there is no agreement for health care 
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data sharing with Texas, but Tarrant County, one of the Texas counties which includes 
the Fort Worth area, has agreed to share their data.82 Instead of state-wide surveillance,  
some surveillance data is restricted to counties and cities only. As a result, one of the 
limitations with the new BioSense version continues to be completeness of surveillance 
data. 
Even with this limitation, the BioSense platform can provide nation-wide 
syndromic surveillance capability but relies on electronic transfer of health care 
encounter and related data from its participants. If an EMP and cyber attack would occur, 
this electronic transfer of data would be disrupted. An attack restricted to a geographic 
area not to include Atlanta where the CDC resides would allow the system to continue 
functioning, but would miss the data from the affected area. More concerning is that such 
an attack would erase exiting data in the surveillance systems. ESSENCE uses algorithms 
comparing historical data to current data feeds to calculate alerts indicating potential 
spikes in syndromic and disease categories. If this functionality is lost in affected areas, 
re-establishing the electronic data transmission after an attack may not be useful for 
continued disease monitoring.  
 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) 
Project BioShield was signed into law in 2004, in response to the need for funds 
to stockpile medical countermeasures against any CBRN threats, even though the initial 
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focus was on biological threats.83 Although the funds are in the DHS appropriation, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was designated as the acquisition 
agency.84BioShield provides funds and spurs private sector research and procurement of 
appropriate medical countermeasures such as new PEP to the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS), while the development of new treatment has been modest in scope.85 
The bill also gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration the authority to provide 
Emergency Use Authorization before licensure for medical countermeasures in the later 
stages of product development in the event of an emergency need.86 Whereas BioShield 
provides funding for research and procurement of products for the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS) in response to a biological attack, the Public Health Service Act 
authorized HHS in coordination with DHS and CDC to maintain the SNS.   
Strategic stockpiles of vaccines as well as respective medication to treat a highly 
contagious diseases can be provided within less than 24 hours to an affected area.87 The 
SNS program was designed to supplement and resupply state and local inventories of 
medicines and supplies during emergencies once local supplies had been exhausted.88 As 
a result, state governors or their designees may request deployment of SNS assets, yet the 
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federal government is responsible for making the decision to deploy all or portions of the 
SNS.89 Each state within the U.S. has established protocols and facilities where sufficient 
amounts of vaccines and antibiotics are being stored, and in addition, facilities across the 
nation collectively house vaccine and antibiotic supplies.90 Major metropolitan areas have 
established measures to ensure supply of vaccines and medicines if needed within 48 
hours through dispensaries in the communities.91 Locations of the warehouses are not 
made public and distribution assumes that the supplies can be readily accessed and 
transported. 
Early outbreak detection can only achieve a lower mortality rate if a rapid and 
high dispensing capacity of vaccines and medications can be achieved among the affected 
population.92 The declaration of a federal or state public health emergency is not required 
to deploy the stockpile and its contents can also be deployed in advance of a public health 
emergency.93 With that being said, local and state authorities need to have the capability 
to communicate their needs to federal authorities, yet means of communications will be 
most likely disrupted during an EMP and cyber attack. Additionally, SNS assets are 
delivered to one predesignated location in the state, and state personnel have to travel to 
the designation to receive and transport the medications to the locations where the 
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supplies are needed.94 Since an EMP will disrupt the transportation infrastructure, state 
personnel will not be able to travel to and from the predesignated SNS location. As a  
result, the federal government needs to be able to provide more support and be prepared 
to deliver the medical assets to the needed locations. Since local and state public health 
authorities have to use their medical stockpiles first, there may not be an initial need for 
SNS supplies during the early stages after an EMP attack. This may allow local 
authorities to reestablish communication, but may also lead to unrest in the population, 
which could make it difficult for federal authorities to deliver needed medical supplies or 
to make their deliver a priority. One possible alternative would be the use of commercial 
products within the local area. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak, 
federal and state health officials identified limited visibility into commercial supply 
chains but also lack of knowledge by local public health authorities on what is available 
through the SNS.95 As a result, the Commercial Supply Chain Dashboard was developed 
to maintain situation awareness on the available medical stock and coordinate supplies 
between local commercial partners and the federal and state governments.96 This 
relationship with private-sector companies to improve the medical response was 
beneficial during the H1N1 pandemic, yet in the aftermath of an EMP attack, this 
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capability would be lost since companies and local public health authorities affected by 
the attack could not forward valuable information electronically. 
 
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) 
The Laboratory Response Network consists of approximately 25,000 commercial 
and private sentinel laboratories for initial detection of biological and other agents, which 
will then be confirmed by over 150 reference laboratories across the nation.97 The LRN 
was established by HHS and CDC in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI), state and local agencies, as well as the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories.98 LRN is funded and managed by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) through CDC, but state and local public health agencies are responsible 
for on-the ground management of network assets and response to positive findings.99 The 
LRN is tasked to maintain an integrated network of state and local public health, federal, 
military, and international laboratories that can respond to bioterrorism and other WMD 
events.100 Since local hospitals and laboratories are often not equipped to work with 
potential biological agents, reference laboratories are needed to accurately identify a 
biological agent during the early stage of transmission to determine the type of care for 
the cases and the preventive measures for the non-affected population.  
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The majority of the 25,000 private and commercial laboratories in the U.S. are 
located in hospitals, clinical institutions, and commercial diagnostic facilities and often 
lines of communications are not well established.101 The laboratories often cannot 
perform specialized testing but can only conduct initial screening. As a result, the sample 
will be forwarded to a reference laboratory that has the ability to investigate referral 
specimens suspect of a biological agent. The referral laboratories are made up of more 
than 150 state and local public health, military, international, veterinary, agriculture, food, 
and water testing laboratories.102 If it was determined that the sample may contain a 
highly contagious agent, the sample will be forwarded to a national laboratories operated 
by the CDC, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID), or the Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC).103 The national 
laboratories will conduct strain characterization of the contagious agents.104 As a result of 
moving samples through the system, it is often unclear who needs to review the results 
and most of the laboratories are not integrated into the EHR can cannot provide their 
results electronically to the patient record. One of the problems with the LRN is that even 
though clear lines of responsibilities have been established, communications between 
laboratories and with public health officials are not always clear. 
One of the challenges after an EMP will be the transportation of samples from the 
local collection sites to the appropriate laboratory since the transportation infrastructure 
will have collapsed. The majority of states and territories currently have laboratories that 
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are designated as Biosafety Level 3 facilities, meaning they are facilities that meet strict 
safety and security guidelines to handle potentially highly infectious agents, yet even 
local transportation will be difficult to undertake.105 Even if transportation were to 
become available, it may not be used for transporting lab specimens but rather food and 
water supplies. Additionally, laboratories within the affected area may not operational 
due to lack of electricity and data analysis tools. The Air Force Research Laboratory 
demonstrated that hydrogen fuel cell technology could be used during a power outage to 
sustain laboratory functions, but these fuel stations could only provide power for 10 days 
and did not provide a long-term solution. Another issue is the communication of 
laboratory results. The majority of the LRN laboratories are not integrated into the 
electronic healthcare record (EHR), so results will not be electronically reported to the 
local providers who ordered the test but has to be reported via phone or email. If a 
biological agent was disbursed prior to an EMP attack so that a national LRN laboratory 
was able to identify the agents, it will be challenging after the EMP to communicate the 
results to the public health officials.  
In summary, existing electronic public health surveillance systems are operated 
by various agencies and have limitations in regards to the way they operate and the data 
they collect. The majority of the systems do not share their data, but if used together, they 
can complement each other and may provide useful early detection capabilities to limit 
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morbidity and mortality within an affected population. After an EMP and cyber attack, 
these systems will become inoperable and existing data may have been erased so that  
once electricity has been restored, they may still not be fully operational. An EMP and 
cyber attack will also have an impact on the systems that manage and monitor medical 
supplies and equipment, so that it will be challenging to ensure the appropriate medical 
supplies are at hand and disbursed. Given that these systems by themselves face 
significant issues that compromise their effectiveness during a response to a biological 
agent, an EMP and cyber attack in combination with a biological agent will confound 
these issues and will make it more difficult conduct health surveillance and coordinate an 
effective medical response.  
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INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF A PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
The tools needed to respond to a public health emergency involving a biological 
threat need to involve the relevant communities. A potential biological weapons’ incident 
needs to involve the public health and medical communities, law enforcement and 
counterterrorism agencies, national security, emergency management agencies, biotech, 
pharmaceutical, and related companies, as well as the scientific community. In order for 
those communities and agencies to work together and coordinate their efforts, the ability 
to communicate during a response to biological agent exposure followed by an EMP and 
cyber attack becomes the main issue. During routine operations, established and standard 
response procedures to a biological agent are well described, yet with concurrent EMP 
and cyber attacks, internal and external factors may create stressors that disable normal 
functioning of agencies. The purpose of communication and coordination is to protect 
and prevent one agency or organization from becoming overwhelmed with the public 
health response and management. Many organizations have crisis contingency and 
disaster recovery plans, but especially civilian organization do not test these plan on a 
regular basis, and most plans do not address concurrent WMD events. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
have the lead on all responses to disasters, including for coordinating the federal response 
to a bio event. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 
(ASPR) is the lead Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agency 
coordinating a medical response to disasters and public health events. DoD Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) and a state’s National Guard are able to support emergency 
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responses with more than 18,000 military responders.  The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) assists state and local governments to develop emergency 
response plans and can support this plans if needed.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) has the authority to investigate individuals that attempt to obtain or use WMD 
materials. As a result, communication to enable coordination of response efforts is crucial, 
and numerous federal agencies will have active roles.  
 
Department of Homeland Security (DHA) 
 The DHA has the mission to ensure a safe and secure homeland, and one of its 
tasks is to ensure resilience to disasters by regulating interaction of federal, state, local, 
tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations.106 One way to build resilience 
is to coordinate the comprehensive federal response to a terrorist attack or large-scale 
event while working with other agencies and the private sector.107 In order to support this 
task, the DHS provides plans and training to its partners. Additionally, the DHS Office of 
Emergency Communications (OEC) developed the National Emergency Communications 
Plan (NECP) to improve emergency communications and interoperability between the 
various response teams and agencies.108 The vision of the NECP is to communicate and 
share information across all levels of government when there is a threat or hazard; yet, 
the plan does not outline what to do in case communication channels have been disrupted 
by an EMP and cyber attack. According to The Homeland Security Act of 2002, the task 
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is not to provide or determine methods of communications, but to provide 
recommendations regarding how the U.S. should support and promote the ability of 
emergency response providers and relevant government officials to continue to 
communicate during an incident.109  With that being said, the DHS emphasizes 
interoperability and the supporting technologies, but does not take it a step further and 
recommend how to protect such communication networks during an EMP, cyber attack, 
or other events. Instead, it is the responsibility of each organization to ensure 
comprehensive cyber training and education on the proper use and security of devices 
and applications.110  Additionally, each organization needs to conduct assessments of  
cyber risks and strategies to mitigate vulnerabilities before the deployment of internet 
protocol-based networks.111 The OEC provides assistance with tools and services, as well 
as technical assistance; yet updating broadband and cyber security may be too costly for 
some states and local organizations. As a result, emergency communications funding by 
DHA needs to be expanded to ensure consistent updating and securing of systems among 
agencies. Nevertheless, the NECP does not address protection of communications 
equipment and devices against EMP specifically, which should be integrated along with 
cyber security requirements.   
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 Using the authorities outlined under the Homeland Security Presidential 
Direactive-5 and the Stafford Act, FEMA leads the federal interagency team in support of 
state governors.112 FEMA’s role is to lay out guiding principles of the DHS’s National 
Response Framework (NRF) for all response partners when preparing for a national 
disaster or an emergency.113 State and local officials have a need for the federal 
government to provide useful tools and assets during an emergency, especially for 
outlying communities, but have often not develop concrete plans for a response, despite 
considerable guidance from the federal government.114 The national framework focuses 
on prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and disaster recovery. The goal is to build 
a culture of preparedness and to ensure that response plans have been established and are 
being maintained, as well as that emergency responders are trained and maintain their 
competency and expertise. FEMA, therefore, has established a National Exercise 
Program (NEP), which allows federal and whole community partners to organize an 
exercise in their community, state, agency, or organization.115 In part, NEP’s purpose is 
to evaluate the preparedness and readiness of the U.S. and across the interagency, and to 
test their ability to perform missions and functions while responding to an emergency or 
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terrorist event.116 FEMA assists with facilitating seminars, workshops, tabletop exercise, 
modeling and simulations, dills, functional exercises, or full-scale exercise to foster 
relationships within and across agencies.117 For the private sector, FEMA promotes 
preparedness through its Ready Business campaign, a nationwide initiative that provides 
materials to businesses to encourage continuity planning and crisis management.118 Yet 
with all the assistance and education FEMA provides, none includes scenarios of an EMP 
and cyber attack during which communication and transportation networks have been 
disrupted. 
 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
 Under the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act, HHS is 
the lead agency for the National Response Framework (NRF) Emergency Support 
Function. The mission of HHS is to plan for all health hazards and to augment state and 
local capabilities when requested, as well as to coordinate all civilian and federal medical 
and public health responders.119 The emergency management group (EMG) is the 
command and control hub for HHS and deals with situational awareness and responds to 
requests by interfacing with regional HHS emergency coordinators who controls 
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activities on the ground.120 For situational awareness, HHS coordinators rely on MedMap, 
which is an interactive geographic information system (GIS)-based electronic mapping 
application that relies on data from numerous sources during a public health 
emergency.121 MedMap has the ability to display medical care sites, assembly centers, 
evacuation routes and evacuation centers, as well as damage-level zones.122 
Unfortunately, this tool will not be available once an EMP and cyber attack have 
disrupted data transfer and rendered electronic devices non-operational. HHS does not 
address if MedMap has been hardened against an EMP and cyber attack, or what system 
could be used instead to gain situational awareness to coordinate a medical and public 
health response. Additionally, it is unclear on how information will flow from the 
regional HHS emergency coordinators to the EMG if communications have been 
disrupted.  
 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
 ASPR is the principal advisor to the HHS Secretary on all matters related to 
public health emergencies preventing and responding to adverse health effects of public 
health emergencies and disasters. ASPR delivers self-sustained medical teams for triage, 
transportation, decontamination, mental health care, medical care, and mortuary duty.123 
ASPR also oversees the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) who has the mission 
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to provide personnel, supplies, and equipment to a disaster area, assist in patient 
movement, as well as provide medical care at hospitals in unaffected areas.124 The 
NDMS is an ASPR-led collaborative partnership among HHS, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and DHS to supplement state 
and local resources.125 Another function of ASPR is to assist the CDC to procure medical 
countermeasures for the SNS so they can be delivered to the affected areas, or in case the 
countermeasure does not yet exist, can fund research and development.126 ASPR has also 
developed numerous playbook scenarios to help implement the role of the HHS as the 
lead agency for public health and medical services under FEMA’s NRF.127 This allows  
participants to exercise decision making under a distinct set of disaster scenarios and 
identifies potential gaps in capabilities and assets.128 ASPR uses various electronic 
systems to manage patients, such as the Joint Patient Assessment and Tracking System 
(JPATS), which is an important system considering that patient care may has to be 
coordinated through various agencies, and patients may have to move through various 
treatment facilities.129 However, JPATS  and NDMS have numerous shortfalls and 
deficiencies, and especially military transports are neither properly equipped nor 
positioned for a timely response and interagency communication.130 More importantly, 
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equipment or personnel to and from an incident site. Yet rather than addressing these 
issues to improve response capabilities, ASPR is developing more system-based 
approaches. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 The CDC is one of the major operating component of the HHS and is tasked to 
monitor the health of the nation for chronic or acute, curable or preventable diseases, as 
well as human error or deliberate biological attacks, to increase health security. In order 
to save lives and protect from health threats, the CDC provides health information, 
conduct research to develop countermeasures, and responds to public health emergencies.  
The CDC Preparedness and Response Capability supports critical infrastructure and 
cross-cutting research to facilitate rapid response to public health emergencies and 
maintains the Emergency Management Program (EMP) and the LRN.131 The CDC’s 
EOC with support of the EMP serves as the command center for monitoring and 
coordinating responses to domestic and international public health emergencies.132 
Clinicians, public health agencies and responders, as well as the general public can report 
potential health threats to the CDC’s EMP, and CDC staff will connect callers to the 
appropriate CDC subject matter expert to address the health concern or threat.133  
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 Within the FDA, the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) 
regulates biological products for human use under applicable federal laws to ensure safe 
and effective use. In emergency situations, the FDA can use mechanisms such as its 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) authority to approve medical countermeasures 
currently not approved for public use.134 One of these products the FDA regulates is the 
collection of blood and blood components used for transfusions in case of a pubic health 
emergency.135 Another function of CBER is the expeditious development and licensing of 
products to diagnose, treat or prevent disease following exposure to a biological agent.136 
Since some biological agents may require long incubation periods for analysis and 
identification and as a result delay a needed response to contain a disease outbreak, 
CBER can approve emergency release of detection tools. CBER works with other federal 
agencies and private industry through the Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) on projects aimed to developing new 
countermeasures for WMD events.137 
 It will be problematic for the FDA to assist local public health and medical 
communities if an EMP and cyber attacks disrupted communication and transportation 
systems. In order to deliver medical countermeasures such as vaccines or blood products, 
it will be important to communicate what is needed, the amount needed, and when these 
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products need to arrive at the site in order to be effectively administered. Lack of 
communication and transportation will significantly delay the support the FDA can offer 
or can coordinate with local agencies.  
 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)  
NORTHCOM is the operational command responsible for homeland defense and  
providing defense support to civilian authorities (DSCA).138 If first responders are  
overwhelmed and additional support is needed, the governor of the affected state may 
choose to deploy the state’s National Guard.139 If an Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC) exists, governors may rely on assistance from other states.140 National 
Guard forces can be drawn from three distinct units depending on the incident and need: 
1) civil support teams; 2) CBRN response; 3) and homeland response forces.141 If 
additional forces are needed, the Secretary of Defense can authorize utilization of DoD 
resources upon request of the state governor following a Presidential disaster 
declaration.142 Additional active duty and reserve forces may be integrated into the 
response process; yet, whether military forces would be send to support medical and 
public health requirements needs to be coordinated with ASPR through the MDNS.143 
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There are two USNORTHCOM response units that can integrate with the National Guard 
forces and support DSCA missions and have the ability to provide additional emergency 
response capabilities.144  
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The FBI’s number one priority is to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, to 
include WMD events such as a biological attack or EMP. As a result, the FBI is the lead 
law enforcement agency responsible for investigation such events.145In response to the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the FBI created a new specialized and 
integrated national security branch (NSB) with an operational element, the WMD 
Directorate or WMDD, to respond to WMD threats and investigate WMD events.146 This 
directorate consists of a unique combination of law enforcement authorities, intelligence 
analysis capabilities, and technical subject matter expertise.147 In order to investigate a 
WMD threat, the WMDD has the responsibility to collect evidence in contaminated areas, 
disarm hazardous devices, and provide direct command and control support for critical 
incidents.148 In 2006, the FBI and Pennsylvania Department of Health epidemiologist 
worked on an inhalational anthrax case. Through sharing of knowledge and collaboration, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Institute of Medicine (IOM). “Nationwide Response Issues After an Improvised 
Nuclear Device Attack: Medical and Public Health Considerations for Neighboring 
Jurisdictions: Workshop Summary”, Washington DC, National Academy Press, 2014, p. 
23-24, http://www.nap.edu/read/18347/chapter/4, (7 Feb 2016). 
145 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Testimony: Ten Years after 9/11 and the 
Anthrax Attacks: Protecting Against Biological Threats”, 2011, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-and-the-anthrax-attacks-
protecting-against-biological-threats , (12 Mar 2016). 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
	  	   49	  
as well as joint environmental sampling and testing the investigation concluded that the 
anthrax exposure was related to occupational exposure of contaminated animal skins 
found in African drums.149 Joint efforts between public health and law enforcement are 
therefore imperative to efficiently address biological events. 
Yet in order to investigate a biological attack a high level of communication and 
cooperation between public health and law enforcement needs to occur.  The FBI and 
CDC developed the Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation training program to 
improve the technical and scientific understanding between public health and law 
enforcement.150 The course focuses on improving local response plans and information 
sharing protocols, and trains participants on the joint investigation principles.151 Yet, even 
with increased mutual awareness and understanding on biological events, in the absence 
of established communication procedures as a result of an EMP and cyber attack, could 
limit the effectiveness of the FBI and public health investigations.152 Additionally, FBI 
laboratories have to investigate and analyze evidence contaminated with a biological 
agent to determine the potential use of a biological weapon and work with CDC and the 
LRN.153 This assumes that after an EMP and cyber attack, FBI field agents will be able to 
reach the outbreak site, and that agents can collect and transport hazardous evidence to 
the medical community and laboratories for analysis. With the collapse of the 	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infrastructure after an EMP, besides communication, basic FBI investigation tools may 
not be accessible or functioning. As a result, FBI support on scene may not be available.  
In summary, every public health response to a biological attack, especially after 
an EMP and cyber attack, require communication and coordination of resources by the  
interagency. Since local organizations have to maintain routine operations of medical 
services, a response to an infectious disease outbreak may create internal and external 
factors that stress the systems and disable normal functioning of agencies. Federal 
agencies have various response plans and resources available to support their local 
counterparts, but these systems and processes may become disabled in the aftermath of an 
EMP and cyber attack. DHS, FEMA, HHS, ASPR, and DoD NORTHCOM have crisis 
contingency and disaster recovery plans, but most civilian organization either do not 
coordinate their plans with these agencies or do not exercise them. The current systems 
therefore already have existing challenges with communication and coordination, which 
become more difficult if an EMP and cyber attack disrupt the electrical grid. 
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CHALLENGES DURING A RESPONSE TO A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK AFTER 
EMP 
 
A response to a potential disease outbreak in a population exposed to a biological 
agent is a multiagency effort facing significant challenges after an EMP. After EMP and 
cyber attacks, parts or all of the communication infrastructure will be disabled, inhibiting 
effective communication from the beginning of the outbreak when collection of 
information is most important to identify the source and agent. Lacking important 
information and data from emergency responders on the ground and laboratories will be 
problematic because informed decision making on public health response coordination 
depends on the most current and complete information. 
 
Interagency coordination  
When communication channels have been disrupted, lack of information may not 
just impact command and control of the situation, but can also negatively impact how 
resources and emergency personnel are utilized, therefore complicating existing 
challenges. Command and control systems are uniquely compromised after an EMP 
relative to other terrorist events because of the massive disruption of communications, 
transportation, the scarcity of resources, and the inability to deploy first responders into  
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areas where there is a medical emergency.154 Additionally, reconstituting command and 
control after it was disrupted will be difficult since additional issues may have developed 
by then such as public unrest. Sharing of valid and timely information is critical when 
coordinating a response and usually functions efficiently during routine operations, but 
functions poorly during dynamic and unknown environments .155 Hierarchical networks 
of communication perform badly in emergencies because if any node fails, parts of the 
network become isolated. 156 In addition, when communications are inadequate, 
personnel and resources are inefficiently used and activities may be unnecessarily 
duplicated.157 In times of crisis, such as during September 11, internal and external 
communications took priority and would have been more effective if more networking 
between agencies prior to the event would have occurred.158 When communicating with 
other organizations, data points themselves may only provide partial information about 
the current situation. Massive collection of data can be of little value until the data are 
shared in a usable way.159 Also, widely shared raw data will be of little use until collated 
and combined meaningfully.160 With that being said, communication is more than just an 
exchange of information but requires interpretation to add context to the information and 
data provided.  	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Each jurisdiction needs to set up an incident command post (ICP) that has legal 
authority to manage the incident, and an emergency operations center (EOC), which is 
the hub of communication and coordination serving the ICP.161 The area-wide ICP should 
include representatives from all affected agencies, such as law enforcement, public health, 
fire, emergency medical services, public works, and transportation.162 The state EOC can 
coordinate activities with local EOCs and area ICPs and serve as a coordinator between 
federal resources and local needs.163 Lack of coordination among agencies may also be 
the result of local public health agencies not always being identified locally or nationally 
as first responders. As a result, public health officials from local agencies and on the 
ground during emergency operations and community drills are often left out of pre-
disaster planning activities and consequently lack expertise and lack resources to 
appropriately assess a community’s vulnerability and capacity.164 There is the assumption 
that if an emergency arises, federal support can be requested and will be provided. Even 
if that were the case, during an EMP and cyber attack, state and federal assistance will 
stall because of the collapse of transportation and communication systems.  
Local public health agencies often have limited staffing, but need to maintain 
some level of response preparedness. Developing detailed plans for every possible 
emergency, including an EMP event, by a local agency may not be feasible due to the 
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sparse resources. Yet, certain public health issues are common to most incidents. This 
resulted in an “all-hazards” approach to incident management and may be more efficient 
and effective across agencies, even though, EMP is not included in this approach because 
there remains a lack of understanding that an EMP is a threat to public health and safety 
especially if concurrent with a biological attack. 
 
Public Health Response  
 Communication across agencies is crucial for situational awareness and to 
coordinate the distribution of resources where needed most. Hospitals need to 
communicate with the local Emergency Medical Service (EMS) system relaying 
information on availability of beds and resources, as well as share with other hospitals in 
the area if they have been overwhelmed with patients.165 Hospitals need to communicate 
with public health agencies and support their ongoing surveillance efforts, since 
electronic surveillance system are not operational. This will be challenging since local 
public health departments are typically short-staffed and not geared toward having one 
person assigned to monitor hospital facilities. There may not be a public health staff 
available so that hospital staff needs to keep track of suspected and confirmed cases to 
report to public health staff when requested. This assumes that hospital staff is trained in 
disease surveillance to take over this function and that they are not needed otherwise in 
the hospital. Surveillance may not be a priority depending on how overcrowded the 
emergency room is so that situational awareness may be limited to the hospital only. 
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During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, state public health systems were highly 
effective in managing and coordinating a complex logistical operation of receiving, 
staging, storing, distributing, and dispensing medical countermeasures.166 This success 
was due to a fully functional communication and transportation systems, which would 
not be available after EMP and cyber attacks. Additionally, computer systems and the 
necessary technology need to be operational at the local level to manage and store the 
supplies received by the SNS, which will not be the case after an EMP. Some vaccines 
and medications need to be refrigerated and backup systems at local supply centers have 
only limited capabilities to maintain refrigeration. Emergency generators are usually only 
set up to support a few days of power, so there currently is no long-term solution in place 
to maintain refrigeration. This may make further distribution and tracking of supplies to 
local distribution centers challenging lack of visibility on how much more medical assets 
will be needed from the SNS to sustain a public health response. Another issues that 
arose during the 2009 response when there was a need for N95 particulate-filtering face-
piece respirators, yet different N95 models were released from the SNS.167 The lack of 
standardization of materials caused problems among recipients of those materials because 
individuals are fit tested to ensure maximum effectiveness of the N95 respirator, so if 
different models are supplied, the personal protection of healthcare workers is at risk.168 
This benefits of having a national stockpile with medical supplies and equipment is only 
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effective if the appropriate supplies are distributed. As a result, communication between 
local and federal authorities managing the SNS is crucial to request the appropriate 
supplies, which during an EMP and cyber attack will be compromised.  
 If preventive measures such as vaccines or treatment options are available to 
contain the spread of a biological agent among the population, mass vaccination 
campaigns need to consider vaccine safety to avoid secondary health issues that may 
drain medical supplies. Monitoring vaccine safety is important because large numbers of 
vaccines might be given in a short period of time, which may trigger more adverse 
events.169 Under normal circumstances, adverse events such as possible side effects are 
reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), which after an EMP 
and cyber attack will not be possible. VAERS serves as an early warning system to detect 
possible safety issues with U.S. vaccines by collecting and compiling adverse event 
reports.170 This will be important when administering new vaccines or medications 
approved for emergency use by the FDA because safety data at the time of administration 
will be limited. In this situation it will be important to closely monitor the population to 
detect unexpected or concerning patterns of side effects, yet this will be challenging due 
to the large number of individuals that received a vaccine or medication combined with 
the fact that none of the surveillance tools will be operational. With that being said, 
healthcare staff may see secondary infections unrelated to the biological agent exposure 
within the community requiring additional resources for treatment. 
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Based on experiences gained from the Oklahoma City bombing, the Tokyo 
subway sarin and the September 11 attacks, casualties may not arrive at a hospital via 
EMS since law enforcement, fire, and EMS personnel may not be available because they 
are responding to the EMP incident and the resulting public unrest. EMS staff will 
usually triage patients prior to arriving at the hospital and assess if special precautions 
need to be taken such as isolation or decontamination. As a result, hospitals may have to 
decontaminate patients prior to entering the hospital. Decontamination procedures are 
more commonly used for patients exposed to chemical and radiation materials, yet certain 
biological agents may warrant decontamination prior to treatment. Several biological 
agents can remain viable in the environment for an extended period of time, lasting from 
hours to days such as ricin and botulinum toxin, and anthrax spores can persist in the 
environment or in clothing for month or years.171 Depending on the decontamination 
measure, affected people may have to be evacuated from exposed areas or quarantined to 
avoid further distribution of the agent. As a result, it will be important to communicate 
laboratory results of the agent quickly, so hospitals can prepare accordingly as well as 
notify other medical facilities and first responders in the affected area. Yet without the 
ability to communicate after an EMP this will slow down necessary quarantine 
procedures and unnecessarily overcrowd emergency rooms. 
Once a biological agent has been identified, it is important to determine the actual 
exposure area in terms of location (indoors, outdoors), access (restricted or open to the 
public), and nature of the agent (airborne particles, solid, fume, etc.). The most common 
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method of decontamination is sealing off the affected area and treating it with a gaseous 
sporicide, such as chlorine dioxide, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, ethylene oxide, or 
paraformaldehyde.172 Hazmat Units from the local fire department should be able to clean 
affected areas, but they may not be able to drive their Hazmat trucks to the location after 
an EMP and need to find other ways to transport their equipment to the affected areas. 
Currently, emergency services have plans and processes in place to respond to 
biological attacks, which include detection, mitigation, and decontamination procedures. 
An EMP and cyber attack would impact not just communication equipment but also 
computers and network equipment as well as transportation. As a result, a biological 
attack will most likely be detected long after individuals show symptoms because it will  
be difficult to travel to a hospital or emergency clinic for care. By that time, any 
infectious agent may have spread from person to person within a population without 
access to treatment and supportive medical care. More importantly, it will be near 
impossible to track cases to determine how many individuals were affected. With the 
additional disruption of the transportation system, it will be difficult to coordinate a 
public health response among agencies and request assistance. Any plans currently in 
place to respond to a biological attack will most likely fail during the aftermath of an 
EMP, and agencies should consider incorporating scenarios that address loss of electricity 
and transportation for lengthy periods of time. 
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Communicating with the Public  
 The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from EMP Attack      
discusses in their report that improving protection and recovery after an EMP attack is 
crucial, yet providing reliable channels of information to citizens about the situation is 
crucial as well.173 The purpose of public health and emergency communication is to offer 
information to the public that is needed to maintain health and safety and to counter 
potentially harmful behaviors, such as public unrest. During an emergency or crisis event, 
individuals experience a wide range of emotional and psychological responses that 
influence their perception of risk, which can lead to anger, fear, depression, and 
anxiety.174 The more outrage individuals feel, the more likely they are to perceive higher 
levels of risk.175 Emergency risk communication during the early stages of an outbreak or 
an incident may be challenging because various agency have jurisdiction over what 
information can be shared and with whom. The FBI is the lead agency for crisis 
management and has the final say over the release of information regarding the incident. 
FEMA, on the other hand, is the lead agency on consequence management and 
operational coordination of mass immunization and contingency medical support and 
needs to release information on prevention and disease management. Each agency has 
developed communication plans, yet after a concurrent EMP attack, neither one will be 
on site during the beginning when events unfold, so local agencies have to assume 	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responsibility for communicating with and informing the public. There are two 
communication streams to the public that need consideration: 1. explain what happened 
and associated risks, and 2. instructions on how to stay safe and healthy.  
Communication information immediately after a biological agent has been 
identified is important to contain a disease and reduce the risk of it becoming an epidemic. 
Often, one of the concerns is the need to protect civil liberties versus the need to stop the 
transmission of disease. In this case, it may actually be advantageous for local public 
health officials who are familiar with their communities to communicate the necessary 
preventive measures rather than an outside agency that has no trust relationship with the 
local population. Local public health officials may also have a better understanding of the 
special needs of elderly, institutionalized persons, and people with visual and hearing 
impairment in their community as well as the need to translate messages into various 
languages commonly spoken in their population. During the September 11 attacks, the 
Department of Health of New York City and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 
engaged in an aggressive public information campaign via the internet to update the 
public on health and safety issues and available medical services.176 This was a well-
received local campaign that addressed the needs of the community but relied heavily on 
electronics and internet capabilities. 
Communicating safety and health messages during the early stages of the event is 
important to reduce illness and injury cases which could have otherwise been prevented. 
Individuals need to maintain personal health and avoid overcrowding emergency rooms, 
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which will use up resources that should be dedicated to treating highly infectious patients 
or other emergencies. During the 2003 major power outage in the Midwest and northeast 
U.S. which affected 50 million people, emergency rooms were overcrowded with carbon 
monoxide poisoning cases.177 These cases resulted from inappropriate placement of 
generators or heaters due to the cold weather; other cases of morbidity and mortality 
included cold injuries, heat-related illnesses, and fire, which could have all been 
prevented if the public had been educated on usage and preparedness.178 Additionally, 
inadequate backup generators at some wastewater treatment plants resulted in the release  
of sewage into surface water, so messages were distributed to alert people to avoid 
contact with public water areas such as beaches or rivers in an effort to reduce enteric 
(diarrheal) illnesses.179 Another risk for enteric illnesses was created by the loss of 
refrigeration and the resulting food spoilage in homes and restaurants, and food 
inspectors found that some foods had reached unsafe temperatures during the power 
outages.180 Enteric diseases are usually not a major concern and can easily be treated with 
antibiotics while staying hydrated, yet with the loss of power and transportation after an 
EMP attack, access to antibiotics and safe drinking water may be limited therefore 
making enteric illnesses life-threatening.  
During a public health emergency, the CDC’s EOC will stand up the Joint 
Information Center (JIC) with staff from the CDC who is trained in risk communication 
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as well as has the public health expertise to answer questions.181 Often the JIC is 
supported by the Joint Information System (JIS) to integrate and coordinate available 
critical emergency information. The CDC also provides risk communication training 
online and has released the Crisis Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) document 
for guidance. One of the key steps toward successful communication is rapid message 
distribution to build credibility and reassure the public that a system is in place and that 
appropriate action has been taken.182 During Hurricane Katrina, power outages were  
more extensive and prevented the use of electronic channels like websites, radio, and 
television to distribute health information.183 Delivery of printed copies of information 
was not possible because CDC trucks could not reach the area because of impassable 
roads.184 Instead, CDC relied on local, face-to-face channels as well as partnerships with 
faith-based organizations, local retailers, and shelters, to deliver health and safety 
messages.185 This mode of communication is time consuming and does not aid in rapid 
message distribution to build credibility, and more importantly, requires large number of 
personnel which after an EMP and biological attack may not be available because their 
focus is on treating patients or distributing clean water. 
Most emergency management events included pre-scripted messages to the public, 
which were released via phone, cell phone, internet, and TV. A healthcare system may 
also use telehealth capabilities to connect with their population and release general health 
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information or patient-specific information via phone or internet. Neither system will 
work after an EMP. Phones, cell phones, computers, television, and radio are all 
vulnerable to EMP and cannot operate without electricity. 186 In addition, satellites that 
operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather, scientific, and military 
purposes will also be vulnerable to an EMP attack.187 As a result, commonly used  
communication methods and social media to inform the public will not be available after 
an EMP. The public health community often provides fliers with important information, 
but since electric printers will most likely not work either, no printed messages can be 
distributed. A public health response to a biological attack is not a single agency effort 
but requires coordination among agencies from the local, state, and federal levels. 
Components of this response effort include the telecommunication, computer and 
electronic equipment, as well as transportation infrastructures.  An EMP and cyber attack 
will significantly disrupt these infrastructures so that coordination efforts will be 
significantly disabled. Lack of surveillance data and case information will make it 
difficult for local emergency responders to determine the health impact on the population. 
Not being able to make informed decisions on the public health response due to the lack 
of data and communication may cause a biological agent to spread more rapidly among a 
population resulting in higher morbidity and mortality. To reduce adverse health impacts, 
emergency responds agencies need to integrate EMP and cyber attack scenarios into their 
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response plans, so they are prepared in the event of massive loss of electricity, 
communication, and transportation.  
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CURRENT ISSUES WITH THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
 Current issues with the public health response are multifaceted and starts with a 
significant lack of understanding of the threat among public health professionals. 
Scientists and medical professionals are focused on their area of expertise and fail to 
understand that the threat of WMD may not that straightforward. Most public health 
professionals do not know what an EMP attack is and how it can impact the infrastructure 
to include emergency response procedures. Most response plan are written for one WMD 
and do not consider concurrent events to inflict mass casualties. Current education and 
training programs on EMP for emergency responders is limited and not readily available 
to everybody involved in a public health response. Additionally, protection and recovery 
of infrastructure needed to detect health outbreaks and assess biological agents have only 
been implemented sparsely. These current issues are reflective of a lack of understanding 
of the threat of an EMP and more education and training is needed within the public 
health community. 
 
Threat Assessment 
The range of actors that might attempt EMP attacks against the U.S. is quite large 
and ranges from states with nuclear weapons, such as Russia and China, to rogue states 
with limited conventional and nuclear military capabilities, such as North Korea and  
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terrorist groups that seek to inflict catastrophic damage on America.188 Despite the 
reduction in the size of the Russian strategic nuclear force, Russia has optimized its 
strategic missile force to generate enhanced EMP effects.189 A 2004 article, Russian 
Major General Vladimir Belous advocated an “asymmetric response” against deployed 
U.S. missile defense capabilities by detonating nuclear weapons pre-positioned in orbit 
above the U.S.190 China’s interest in EMP goes back decades, and there is concerns in 
Taiwan that China will use EMP weapons as part of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.191 An 
EMP attack would probably be very attractive to North Korea because its primitive 
economy would be less vulnerable to EMP than those of advanced industrial nations, and 
the use of EMP against U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula would be a suitable 
option.192 According to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
Commander Adm. William Gortney, North Korea has mobile intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, the KN-08, armed with nuclear warheads that can strike the U.S.193 While the 
KN-08 is inaccurate and may not reach a specific target in the U.S., it could be used to 
launch a high-altitude nuclear EMP attack.194 Furthermore, in July 2013, a North Korean 
freighter transited the Gulf of Mexico with two unarmed, but nuclear capable, SA-2 	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missiles mounted on their launchers, while Iranian freighters regularly visit their allies in 
Cuba and Venezuela.195 As a result, the U.S. may be at risk for a ship-launched EMP 
attack. 
Unlike other means of a WMD, such as chemical and biological weapons, which 
may require laboratory facilities and scientific expertise for safe handling, EMP weapons 
have much simpler requirements for handling, storage, and execution. International arms 
control treaties have made chemical and biological weapons the nearly exclusive 
prerogative of rogue states196, even though the replication of biological agents by 
scientists and in makeshift laboratories is still a possibility. Yet, materials for an EMP 
weapon can be readily purchased at local hardware stores and can be easily applied. A 
larger EMP weapon could be hidden in a small van with side panels made of fiberglass, 
which is transparent to electromagnetic radiation.197 If the van is parked about 5 to10 
meters away from the target, the electromagnetic fields propagating to the wall of the 
building can be very high, especially if the walls are masonry without metal shielding.198 
Most building do not have metal shielding because it would disrupt personal cellphone 	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communication once inside a building. Utilizing a nuclear device to trigger an EMP may 
require more technical knowledge, but given that only one device will be needed to 
achieve a WMD attack, a determined adversary may be willing to make the effort. 
In order to cause mass destruction, the leader of a rogue state may not be 
motivated to use a small nuclear arsenal to launch a crippling HEMP strike against the 
U.S. with no resulting fatalities, but may be more plausible if used in combination with a 
biological attack. 199 A smaller-scale HEMP weapon requires a relatively simple design, 
and can be built using electrical materials and chemical explosives that are readily 
available for purchase.200 It is possible to construct a suitcase-size HEMP for less than 
$2,000 within the capabilities of almost any nation and many terrorist groups.201 
The former Soviet Union began its biological weapons program in the 1920s, and 
even though it signed onto the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) to 
discontinue the program, sources relayed that the program continued into the 1990s.202 
Today, Russian has still not allowed inspectors into all of its facilities capable of 
producing biological weapons.203 The Department of State assesses that China, Iran, 
North Korea, Russia, and Syria continue to engage in dual-use or biological weapons-
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specific activities and are failing to comply with the BWC.204 The most likely source of a 
bioterrorism are not governments, but radicalized groups or individuals, both within the 
U.S. or outside, that intend to utilize biological agents to cause mass casualties.205 
Terrorist organizations have expressed intent to use and show some capacity to develop 
biological weapons.206 Scientific expertise on acquiring biological resources and 
development of a biological weapon can be easily obtained through the internet. 
Additionally, small amounts of bacterial agents are sufficient to be cultured and grown 
into larger quantities in laboratories. Some agents, such as ricin, is readily available as a 
waste product of castor oil production, which is commonly used in the cosmetics 
industry.207 Additionally, some laboratory leaders have paid insufficient attention to the 
details necessary to ensure laboratory biosafety and have inadvertently contributed to the 
biological threat.208  
 
Preparing for Concurrent WMD Attacks 
One of the issues with protection from biological, EMP, and cyber attacks is that 
reliance on technology is encouraged. The heavy reliance on health surveillance tools has 
been outlined previously, but it is also the response management and coordination 
community that utilizes electronic systems to faster and more accurate exchange data in 	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an effort to improve preparedness and coordination during an incident response. Current 
technologies, such as incident communication networks, disease surveillance databases, 
and resource distribution tools have made a dramatic and positive difference in the 
overall preparation for and response to 9/11-like events and subsequent incidents.209   
 Software automation tools are available to support the planning, coordination and 
response of local governments and private sector organizations to potential emergencies 
and biological threats.210 Management technologies may include functionality for event 
prediction, contingency planning, consequence coordination and response, post-event 
audit and documentation, recovery and remediation initiatives, as well as simulation and 
drill development.211 During 2013, the CDC conducted two emergency notification drills 
with organizations that had received CDC funds for preparedness and response 
capabilities.212 The goal was to test whether CDC’s EOC, laboratory staff, and 
epidemiologists could contact each other regarding potential threats and disease 
outbreaks in a timely manner.213 The target response time was 45 minutes for each drill 
with 84 percent of participants meeting the target in the first drill and 94 percent meeting 
the target in the subsequent drill.214 The problem is not necessarily reliance on these 
established communication and surveillance systems, but that no efforts have been 
established and outlined on what to do if those systems become non-operational. Local, 	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state, and federal emergency management plans do not include back-up plans in case 
these electronic systems fail during an EMP and cyber attack. Neither response plans to 
biological agents nor overall incident nor emergency plans—regardless of organization—
contain appendices that outline how to coordinate a response when the power grid is not 
operational. As a result, there is a false sense of security among public health agencies 
and responders that they are sufficiently prepared to respond to any threat.  
In 2013, the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal 
Damage Act (SHIELD Act; H.R. 2417) was introduced to Congress. The SHIELD Act 
assumes that the U.S. is currently ill-prepared to recovery after an EMP event and that the 
loss of electrical power systems will have catastrophic consequences to include potential 
casualties in excess of 60% of the population. As a result, the SHIELD Act would 
authorize the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to propose standards and 
processes for industry and government alike to address vulnerabilities of the electric 
grid.215 Congress has not passed the SHIELD Act because it would require industry to 
harden and protect its electric infrastructure at a high cost. In addition, the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA) was also introduced in 2013, which authorizes DHS 
to include EMP events in national planning scenarios and conduct outreach to  
educate owners and operators of critical infrastructure and emergency planners and 
responders on the threats by EMP events.216 The CIPA Act passed the House in 
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December 2014. Whereas some bills and plans have been established, little effort has 
been made so far to physically protect the electrical grid. 
 
Education and Training 
Education and training are crucial in ensuring that healthcare professionals can 
adequately recognize and respond to a biological attack as well as help maintain 
professional skills and expertise. The CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response (PHPR) conducts training and exercises to prepare state and local health 
departments to respond effectively during an emergency when SNS assets are deployed 
to ensure that vaccines and medications are received in a timely manner if local supplies 
have run out.217 Yet, none of the exercises include scenarios in which the transportation 
and communication systems have failed. In 2014, ASPR and CDC together awarded 
more than $840 million in emergency preparedness and response fund to improve 
existing response measures.218 Whereas the close alignment of the funding support 
improved efficiency in grant administration, no funding was allotted toward evaluating 
the supported programs. It is therefore uncertain if funding has improved levels of 
preparedness within organizations and whether gaps in health security preparedness such 
as EMP have been identified and addressed. 
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Another problem is that emergency preparedness training is often limited to 
federal, state, and local agencies and first responders and not routinely to primary care 
providers.219 Affected individuals may not necessarily seek care in the emergency room  
but consult with their primary care provider, their staff or support staff, so 
providing training to even the nonmedical personnel in a physician’s office could aid in 
early detection.220 Medical schools offer various courses on national disaster and 
emergencies, hazardous materials, and federal emergency response, but there is no 
recognized standard for training providers and these courses are not widely utilized.221 
Once providers practice in the community, they should seek opportunities to become 
familiar with local emergency medical series as well as local chain of command and their 
contact information.222 The coordination problem between inter-governmental agencies is 
exacerbated by the lack of a comprehensive biodefense strategy and a unified approach to 
budgeting.223  
 Many public and private organizations lack the comprehensive emergency 
response plan that defines the roles and responsibilities of trained personnel responding to 
an unexpected incident.224 Additionally, most plans do not extensively describe how to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Dudley G, McFee RB, “Preparedness for Biological Terrorism in the United States: 
Project BioShield and Beyond”, The Journal of the American Osteopathic Association, 
2005, 105(9), p. 421. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Dudley, p. 422. 
223 Hudson Institute,  “A National Blueprint For Biodefense: Leadership and Major 
Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts,” Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel 
on Biodefense, Oct 2015, p. 20, at http://hudson.org/research/11824-a-national-blueprint-
for-biodefense-leadership-and-major-reform-needed-to-optimize-efforts (Nov 1, 2015). 224	  Smith	  SD,	  “Inter-­‐Agency	  Collaboration	  and	  Consequence	  Management:	  An	  All-­‐Hazard	  Approach	  to	  Emergency	  Incident	  Response”,	  EHS	  Today,	  16	  May	  2006,	  http://ehstoday.com/fire_emergencyresponse/ehs_imp_17938,	  (6	  Dec	  2015).	  
	  	   74	  
work side-by-side with responders from other agencies.225 Many organizations do not 
know where to turn for assistance regarding emergency preparedness, nor do they have 
the time to stop the daily task of operating a business or service.226 If training is mandated, 
agencies participating in an emergency response are often not coordinated in their 
efforts.227 During the 2003 power outage in the Midwest and Northeast U.S., public 
health and emergency responders noted that there was a lack of preparations and 
resources for coping with public anxiety and behavioral issues, lack of training in dealing 
with power outage emergencies, and lack of planning for multiple-system failures across 
states when relying on aid from nearby communities.228 In addition, the assumption is 
that healthcare staff trained in emergency response and disease surveillance will be in the 
right place at the right time to respond to a biological event after an EMP. Yet, with the 
collapse of the transportation infrastructure, trained staff may not be able to reach their 
hospital or public health facility in a timely manner or at all. Under normal circumstances, 
it may make sense to only train a selected few individuals as emergency essential 
personnel who can then direct the remaining staff, but after an EMP this concept will not 
work. With that being said, all hospital and public health staff should prepare for 
emergencies and catastrophic events in some capacity to take over duties if colleagues 
cannot reach the medical facility. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Smith SD, “Inter-Agency Collaboration and Consequence Management: An All-
Hazard Approach to Emergency Incident Response”, EHS Today, 16 May 2006, 
http://ehstoday.com/fire_emergencyresponse/ehs_imp_17938, (6 Dec 2015). 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Kile JC, Skowronski S, Miller MD et al., “Impact of 2003 power outages on public 
health and emergency response”, Prehosp Disaster Med,2005, 20(2), p. 96. 
	  	   75	  
 There also is a lack of understanding what an EMP attack is and how it can 
impact existing infrastructure to include the emergency response systems. Without this 
knowledge and threat awareness, public health professionals will be less likely to make 
EMP training a priority or necessity.  
 
Protect and Recover of Critical Infrastructure 
 Biological threats are real, whether naturally occurring or man-made through 
bioterrorism event, and various protective measures are in place or could be implemented 
on short notice. Incidents of biological threats, such as the anthrax exposure at the DC 
post office in 2001, have been well documented and communicated to the public making 
them less of a concern to the public. Yet, the success of mitigating potential outbreaks is 
in part due to the heavy reliance on disease surveillance tools and rapid testing 
capabilities by the public health community. At the same time, EMP threats are not taken 
seriously and only limited protective measures have been implemented, especially in the 
civilian sector. With that being said, the electrical grid and critical infrastructure are left 
vulnerable to an EMP and loss of power for weeks or months if not longer may be the 
consequence if an attack should occur. This in turn, will affect the public health 
capabilities and can disrupts detection and preventive measures causing highly 
contagious agents otherwise readily contained to become biological threats. Yet, it seems 
that neither the public nor Congress make this connection and are reluctant to emphasize 
protective measures to mitigate power loss as a result of an EMP. 
State and local governments have made sparse efforts to incorporate EMP 
preparedness and response measures into their response plans. Alaska and some New 
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York municipal organizations include EMP preparedness measures in their response 
plans.229 Whereas most of these plans address survivability measures, they do not include  
actual hardening of electricity-based infrastructure. The variability in how local and state 
governments address their needs for protective measures against an EMP attack is often 
due to lack of knowledge on the impact of an EMP on the electrical grid. The DoD, on 
the other hand, has continuously prepared for an EMP over the past decade and continues 
to invest in hardening its military infrastructure. In 2012, the DoD spent $22.1 million to 
harden Minuteman missiles against EMP attacks.230 The NORAD Commander recently 
announced that NORAD headquarters which provides early warning and command and 
control for the defense of the continental U.S. against nuclear attack has been moved 
from Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado back into Cheyenne Mountain because going 
underground ensured protection against EMP.231 In addition, the Pentagon awarded a 
$700 million contract to upgrade its electronics through 2020.232 With that being said, 
most computers and electronic equipment in DoD is still vulnerable, so an EMP could 
still severely degrade the ability of Armed Forces to operate effectively. 
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If an EMP attack would occurr, near-term recovery would prove impossible 
because of America’s dependence on the electrical grid.233 The complexity is exacerbated 
by the interdependence of the grid and other critical infrastructures such as telecom,  
natural gas and oil, water supply systems, banking and finance, and transportation.234 
Restarting the grid, also known as “black start”, requires communication and energy 
transport, which both depend on electricity and can therefore not be performed. Black 
start capacity could be extended with at-site fuel switching capability.235 Transformers 
and generators are not readily available for purchase and repairs may take months.236 
Instead, modernizing and hardening of the electrical grid would limit some of the 
destructive effects on the power grid. Engineering approaches such as shielded enclosures, 
grounding techniques, current limiting line filters, terminal protection devices, and cable 
management are costly if added to an existing grid, yet most cost effective if integrated 
into the design phase of new grid developments. 
 Current grid protection measures require state legislator involvement since they 
have regulatory authority over the systems, so states can require power companies to 
install blocking devices and other technologies to protect against EMP or geomagnetic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 McNeill JB, Weitz R, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: A Preventable Homeland 
Security Catastrophe, 20 Oct 2008, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/10/electromagnetic-pulse-emp-attack-a-
preventable-homeland-security-catastrophe, (6 Dec 2015). 
234 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), “Enhancing Distribution Resiliency: 
Opportunities for Applying Innovative Technologies”, Jan 2013, p. 3, 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000000000102
6889&Mode=download, (6 Dec 2015). 
235 Foster JS, Gjelde E, Graham WR, Hermann RJ, Kluepfel HM, Lawson RL, Soper GK, 
Wood LL, Woodard JB, “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United 
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures” Apr 
2008, p. 57,  http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pd, 
(6 Dec 2015). 
236 Foster, p. 50. 
	  	   78	  
disturbances.237According to the National Governors Association, 70 percent of 
transmission lines and transformers are at least 25 years old, 60 percent of circuit  
breakers are at least 30 years old, and much of the infrastructure was designed in the 
1950s making the entire grid vulnerable to EMP.238 One of the major issues that limits 
grid modernization is that the current spending of $34 billion per year to maintain and 
partially upgrade the grid will have to be increased by $8 to $16 billion per year through 
2030 to ensure a fully modernized grid.239 A modern grid would address cyber security as 
well as EMP as well as increased consumer demand, so governors have an important role 
in moving this agenda forward and making it a funding priority.  
 The public health response to a biological attack during the aftermath of an EMP 
and cyber attack is facing considerable challenges. One of the most important issues is 
that EMP threat awareness is almost non-existing in the medical and public health 
community. There is a failure to understand that the disruption of the communication and 
transportation infrastructure will significantly impact surveillance and emergency 
response efforts. As a result, EMP scenarios are not integrated into response plans 
leaving the public health community underprepared if such an event should occur. The 
limited training that is available through federal agencies is not offered to all emergency 
responders and is not a mandatory as part of the annual training curriculum. Additionally, 
protection and recovery of infrastructure is limited  	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through sparse research funding and limited funding to upgrade the states’ electrical grid. 
Congress and state governors have not made EMP protection a priority issue and have not 
mandated comprehensive improvements to the current infrastructure. The majority of 
these issues is related to a lack of understanding the threat of an EMP, especially within 
the public health community, and requires an open dialog on this topic. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The U.S. heavily depends on the electrical grid and critical infrastructure for 
survival and daily operations. At the same time, the majority of the electricity-based 
infrastructure is vulnerable to an EMP attack that could disrupt the shut down the entire 
grid. This threat is real because the number of U.S. adversaries with intent and capability 
of a nuclear EMP attack is greater than during the Cold War, yet the public does not seem 
to recognize that threat. EMP is often perceived as science fiction, rather than WMD, and 
the lack of understanding what an EMP is and its impact on the U.S. infrastructure and 
human survival in the long-term will prevent the implementation of much needed 
preventive measures. EMP events have already occurred in the U.S., even though at a 
smaller scale, and it took weeks or months to fully restore the electrical grid. Yet these 
events are not being recognized as EMP but rather “power outages” which are not 
comparable events. EMP and cyber attacks do not cause initial mass destruction to the 
environment and population like a nuclear WMD would to, yet it is the cascade and 
potential multiplication of effects that can be catastrophic.240 Combined with a biological 
attack, EMP and cyber attacks could amplify the effects of a biological attack because the 
loss of the electrical grid and electricity-based critical infrastructure could disable 
detection and response efforts as well as disrupt interagency efforts to coordinate a 
medical response.  
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One could argue that after EMP and cyber attacks adversaries may not see the 
need for a biological attack because lack of electricity, water and food supplies alone will 
result in significant loss of lives. Also, the emphasize on supporting the medical and 
public health community may be short lived since food and water supplies, as well as 
restoring electricity and critical infrastructure may have a higher priority and take away 
resources and personnel from the medical response. It is also unknown how an EMP 
attack will impact the grid since some systems may have been protected or hardened 
without being impacted by the EMP and cyber attacks. Currently, there is no requirement 
for agencies to keep track of any systems improvements that would protect against EMP, 
so it is unclear, who and what systems will be disrupted. During previous major power 
outages across state lines, telecommunication systems continued to function at some 
capacity so the impact may not be as catastrophic as anticipated or worse. The public 
perceives a power outage or EMP commonly as a nuisance and inconvenience rather than 
a threat to their survival, so besides lack of federal support, the public may not see the 
needs to support public health efforts until the first patients arrive at the hospital and an 
epidemic becomes unmanageable. Yet, in order to recover from these attacks and to 
restore order and electricity, healthy people need to be available who can contribute to 
the recovery process. Also, the domestic consequences of a biological attack concurrent 
with EMP and cyber attacks may be so devastating that the U.S. military may not be able 
to organize a coherent retaliatory strike against the aggressor; especially because it may  
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be too difficult to rapidly determine the perpetrator of these attacks.241 The ability 
to identify and contain the spread of a biological agent in a population to reduce 
morbidity and mortality will aid in the overall recovery process, and it should be a major 
focus of emergency response plans to incorporate preparations for concurrent WMD 
attacks. More importantly, the delivery of aid in a chaotic post-EMP environment will be  
impossible without robust pre-disaster planning that integrates federal, state, local, 
private, and non-governmental organizations.242 As a result, agencies involved in medical 
emergency response need to consider adding EMP and cyber attack scenarios to their 
response plans. 
There are numerous issues that need to be considered when preparing for 
concurrent biological, EMP, and cyber attacks of which some were also addressed by the 
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack 
in their report. Some of the major issues to consider are the following: 
1) Threat awareness: The Commission recommended that individuals in positions of 
authority and responsibility be trained to recognize an EMP attack and understand the 
wide range of effects it can produce as well as analyze the status of the infrastructure 
systems.243 The report does not specifically include medical and public health 
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professionals, but recommends awareness for all leaders and those with authority. As a 
result, this topic is not seen as an urgent or not a large enough threat requiring the 
attention of the medical community and may be a missed opportunity by the Committee 
to draw medical leadership into the EMP discussion. Congress has reassumed its 
leadership role on EMP and held hearings in 2008, but its ability to compel executive 
branch action in this area is limited.244More research will be needed to assess the type of 
damage to the U.S. infrastructure based on the EMP weapon utilized. Also more 
information will be needed on the knowledge and expertise potential adversaries have 
acquired on EMP, cyber, and biological weapons to determine the current threat. Yet, the 
information currently available should suffice to educate those not familiar with the 
impact of EMP and cyber attacks and should be integrated into current response and 
training plans. 
2) Medical preparedness by the interagency: The Commission also recommends that 
training, procedures, simulations, and exercise must be developed and carried out to 
address the effects of an EMP, since the immediate aftermath is not the time to begin 
planning for an effective response.245 Agencies tasked to provide emergency response 
and medical care are heavily dependent on electronics, telecommunications, and 
information technology to conduct surveillance and coordinate their response. These 
technological innovations have brought great benefits, but also make the U.S. vulnerable 	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to an EMP and cyber attack. Telecommunication is important for personnel within each 
agency and local responders to coordinate support and recovery efforts. To offset the 
temporary loss of electric power, telecommunications sites started to utilize a mix of 
batteries, mobile generators, and fixed-location generators, but these typically only 
provide backup power from 4 to 72 hours.246 These temporary fixes may be sufficient for 
a power outage but not an EMP attack, which can cause a power outage to last for months. 
Additionally, a concurrent biological attack may be identified after an incubation period 
of a few days to weeks, so backup generators need to provide longer periods of power to 
enable surveillance and case identification. With that being said, comprehensive 
preparedness by the interagency to respond to a concurrent EMP, cyber and biological 
attack remains underdeveloped.  
3) Protection and recover of critical infrastructure: The Commission points out that very 
little research and development has been spent to address EMP- related system response 
protection and recovery issues.247It is impractical to protect the entire electrical power 
system from damage by an EMP attack because there are too many components of too 
many different types, but it is practical to determine which systems need to remain 
operational and reduce the impact on the systems and reduce their recovery time.248Yet, 
government support for research to develop EMP response measures and devices to 
harden the electronic infrastructure has been limited because EMP is still not a priority 
issue. Since an EMP attack is most likely to occur via a ballistic missile armed with a 	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nuclear warhead, the suggestion has been made to build a missile defense system that 
would intercept and destroy the missile before it could cause an EMP.249 This would 
require Congress to send a clear message that the U.S. is serious about protecting itself 
against EMP, while justifying large amounts of resources and funding being dedicated 
towards this effort.   
Biological, EMP, and cyber attacks, whether applied individually or combined, 
will not cause the initial mass destruction other WMD would cause, even though that 
does not make them less of a threat. Cascading failure of critical infrastructure will affect 
civilian and military capabilities to support our survival and compromise recovery. As a 
result, efforts to mitigate the effect of these concurrent attacks need to be well planned or 
coordinated. Interagency and multi-disciplinary efforts are needed to respond to 
developing threats and issues. Comprehensive threat assessment and scenario planning 
for EMP and cyber attacks remain underdeveloped and so does a combined attack with a 
biological agent. As a result, local, state, and federal agencies need to incorporate EMP, 
cyber, and concurrent WMD events in their response planning and exercises. Key steps to 
mitigate the catastrophic effects of an EMP attack are to prevent an attack in the first 
place, prepare so personnel can respond after an attack, protect the critical infrastructure 
to limit the impact, and recover after an attack to restore power and critical infrastructure.  
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